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INTRODUCTION
Claims of copyright protection that overreach the bounds of
justifiable legal rights occur in many different contexts. Indeed, in
almost any copyright litigation, issues regularly surround the
legitimacy of the copyright and the rightful claim to it. Although
multitudes of copyright questions arise daily, few of them ever go
before a judge. Most people struggle with their conflicts and
decisions in the simpler context of day-to-day transactions. One
context where such decisions routinely arise is the use of images of
artworks, especially high-quality images that museums and other
organizations make of the original art in their collections. Though
the law is unclear regarding copyright protection afforded to such
images, many museum policies and licenses encumber the use of
art images with terms of use and license restrictions.1
Quality reproductions are critical to creating art history books
or museum exhibition websites, and high-resolution and accurate
photographic images can be expensive to produce. Some museums
find that supplying images can be an active and lucrative service,
or at least the museum may strive to cover expenses. Museums
often assert rights of control over the images by means of
copyright or contract and licensing terms. This article explores the
extent to which museums have strained the limits of copyright
1

Whatever the terms and conditions of use, museum policies can ultimately drive
users to secure permissions for many uses, burdening research and the sharing of
enjoyable and important works of art. Christopher Lyon, The Art Book’s Last Stand, ART
IN AMERICA, Sept. 2006, at 51 (calling the process ―Permissions Purgatory‖).
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claims and indeed have restructured concepts of ownership and
control in ways that curtail the availability and use of art images
far beyond anything that may be grounded in copyright law.2
This analysis of museum policies examines the matter of
overreaching by placing them in the context of copyright law. Part
II sets forth the background of this study through the collection and
analysis of policies and license terms from major museums in the
United States. Part III lays a foundation of copyright law,
including rights of use, duration of protection, and the limited
protection of moral rights under American law. Parts IV and V
explore the challenge of policymaking at museums. These sections
identify the difficulties that museums face as they might seek to
develop policies more conducive to meeting the needs of users, or
that at least address the nuances of copyright law in service of the
public interest in access to and use of art images.
Part VI offers an original breakout of varieties of overreaching
in museum policies. While this section provides specific examples
of museum practices as forms of overreaching, it also highlights
examples of alternative approaches that museums have used to
address the issue in a manner that better responds to copyright and
the interest of users. This study demonstrates that overreaching
occurs in different forms, and that the pressures for overreaching
are endemic in the law and in the exigencies of practical
applications.
Nevertheless, policymakers have realistic
alternatives for better standards, as this article will show.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
One of the central problems motivating this analysis is the
potential conflict between the terms of museum policies and the
educational and public interest objectives of the institution.3 On
2

For a study of the problem before the Bridgeman case reshaped much of the
discussion about related copyright law, see generally Kathleen Connolly Butler, Keeping
the World Safe from Naked-Chicks-In-Art Refrigerator Magnets: The Plot to Control Art
Images in the Public Domain through Copyrights in Photographic and Digital
Reproductions, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 55 (1998).
3
The tension was expressed in another way:
As museums and cultural institutions throughout the world utilize
multimedia technology to ‗open up‘ their collections to a worldwide
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the one hand, the museum has a primary objective of informing the
public about art and opening opportunities to understand and
appreciate creative works. On the other hand, museums often feel
the pressure to set restrictions that ultimately limit access and
confine uses of art images. Policies reveal much about how
museums choose to resolve that tension.4
This paper is one outcome of a study of museum licensing
practices funded by The Samuel H. Kress Foundation.5 The
principal objective of the study has been to gather and analyze a
sample of art museum policies and to examine their similarities
and differences, producing a systematic inventory of the range of
issues addressed in license agreements and the different ways in
which museums respond to these issues. Through analysis of
diverse terms and conditions, this project has the potential to
demonstrate options that museums have when drafting licenses,
policies, and other terms of use to address specific concerns.6
The study analyzes policy terms from a sample of art museums
in the United States. Fifty museums, each with a primary specialty
in art were selected from the accredited members of the American
Association of Museums. The selected museums were chosen with
an aim toward achieving a diverse sample in terms of the size and
nature of their collections, the staffing and budget, and the scope of

public in an effort to promote universal cultural development,
directors of these institutions must balance new rights in valuable
digital information assets with demands of an international audience
and the ability of that audience to copy easily from digital media.
Marilyn Phelan, Digital Dissemination of Cultural Information: Copyright, Publicity, and
Licensing Issues in Cyberspace, 8 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 177, 180 (2001–02).
4
One study lays out the ―paradox‖ for museums: ―a situation characterized by
competing impulses to broadcast images in furtherance of educative missions (and
perhaps a reputation for high-tech sophistication) and to restrain the distribution of those
images in order to preserve their economic value by reducing the risk of pirated copies.‖
Mitch Tuchman, Note, Inauthentic Works of Art: Why Bridgeman May Ultimately Be
Irrelevant to Art Museums, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 287, 288 (2001).
5
For another publication resulting from the project, see Kenneth D. Crews & Melissa
A. Brown, Control of Museum Art Images: The Reach and Limits of Copyright and
Licensing, in THE STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CAN ONE SIZE FIT ALL?
269 (Annette Kur & Vytautas Mizaras, eds., 2011).
6
Details about the background and other aspects of the Kress study are set forth in
Kenneth Crews, Interim Report: Art Image Copyright and Licensing Study (June 29,
2010), http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:128139.
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their image licensing practices. The Kress grant supported the
detailed project of locating policy terms from almost all of the fifty
identified institutions and isolating and organizing the terms in a
manner that allows for a comparison of the specific language used
in each.7
This article focuses on selected provisions from the policies
surveyed. This study does not attempt to identify quantitatively
measured trends in policymaking or museum practices, although
examination of the terms does suggest that some provisions are
comparatively common, and museum practices appear to trend in
certain directions. The methodology used in this study is aimed at
identifying forms and varieties of policy practices and
comprehending the substantive character and likely consequences
of those provisions.
The provisions analyzed are substantive terms established by
the museums as conditions or requirements that the museum
expects users to follow in exchange for the museum‘s consent for
their use of the art images in question. They are effectively the
quid pro quo for permission to use. The provisions may be
presented as ―terms of use‖ or as formal license agreements.8 They
may be labeled as ―policy‖ or as contractual language. One
museum may ask for formal consent from the user, and the next
museum may state that users are deemed to consent to the terms by
virtue of using the collection or the website. In any event, the
provisions reflect a decision by the museum that the terms are
proper, and as a result the terms are akin to a policy choice. This
article will often use the label ―policy‖ to encompass all of these
possibilities.

7

See Melissa A. Brown & Kenneth D. Crews, Art Image Copyright and Licensing:
Compilation and Summary of Museum Policies (Mar. 8, 2010), available at
http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:128159.
8
This article presumes that the provisions are enforceable, while one must
acknowledge that there is an open question about the legally binding nature of ―terms of
use‖ and related license terms. See generally, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d
1447 (7th Cir. 1996); see also infra note 73 (regarding a lawsuit filed against the
Berkeley Historical Society).
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II. BACKGROUND OF COPYRIGHT LAW
A. Rights and Limitations
The museum policies analyzed in this article are responsive to
copyright issues, or at the least they purport to set standards for
uses that are otherwise governed by copyright law.
Fundamentally, copyright law grants a set of exclusive rights to the
owner of the copyright.9 An artist, whether little known or world
famous, may create a stunning new painting, and the law will
generally grant automatic copyright protection to that artist with
respect to that work.10 While copyright protection is extensive in
many respects, it is also limited in others. Copyright law grants the
copyright owner a bundle of rights, such as the right to make
reproductions and derivative works or to make public displays of
those works.11 These rights are implicated when a museum makes
or reproduces a digital image of an original painting. The use of
that image for a research study, a set of gift cards, or coffee mugs
may also be considered a reproduction or a derivative work.12
Simply putting the work on display in the museum may be a form
of public display that violates the rights of the copyright owner.13
The rights of the copyright owner are limited in many
important ways. First, not all rights apply to all works. Most
notably, sound recordings do not have full rights of public
performance.14 Second, the rights are subject to limitations and

9

Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
Id. § 102(a).
11
Id. § 106.
12
The Copyright Act defines a derivative work as ―a work based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment,
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.‖
Id. § 101.
13
The concept of public display is defined broadly in the Copyright Act. The most
relevant part of the definition states, ―to perform or display it at a place open to the public
or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a
family and its social acquaintances is gathered . . . .‖ Id. § 101. However, the public
display right is sharply limited by an exception that allows the display of an authorized
copy of the work, at the place where the copy is located, such as at a museum. Id. §
109(c).
14
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 & 114 (2006).
10
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exceptions, most notably fair use.15 The Copyright Act in the
United States and in most countries includes several statutory
provisions that create exceptions to the rights of copyright
owners.16 Many of these exceptions are important in the context of
art. Fair use and some exceptions related to education and research
can apply to artworks.17 Third, the rights under copyright are also
limited in duration. Copyrights do last for many years, indeed
many decades, but they do eventually expire.18 The artistic
accomplishments of recent artists, such as Andy Warhol or Roy
Lichtenstein are surely under copyright protection.19
By
comparison, Pablo Picasso began his artistic career in the late
nineteenth century, and it extended until his death in 1973. Many
of his works are recent enough to still be under copyright
protection, but some of his earliest pieces may be in the public
domain. We can be much more confident in concluding that the
masterworks by Rembrandt, da Vinci, and other great artists from
long ago are securely in the public domain and without any
copyright protection.20
15

Fair use is codified at Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act, but other exceptions
continue in Sections 108–22. See id. §§ 107–22.
16
Most countries have multiple statutory exceptions. Often the exceptions apply to
familiar activities, but the details of the statutes vary greatly from one country to the next.
The author of this article conducted a study for WIPO, demonstrating that statutory
exceptions for libraries are common in worldwide copyright laws, but the detailed
provisions are hardly consistent. See generally Kenneth D. Crews, Study on Copyright
Limitations and Exceptions for Libraries and Archives, WIPO (Aug. 26, 2008),
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=109192.
17
For example, Section 108 allows libraries to make copies of certain works for
preservation and replacement and for personal study and research. The preservation and
replacement provisions can apply to art and visual images; the research and study
provisions do not apply to art, except art images that may be part of or an adjunct to a
textual work. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 108(i) (2006). Section 110 allows
performances and displays of works in the classroom and in distance education, and with
some conditions the statutes apply to art and visual images. Id. §§ 110(1), 110(2).
18
For the statutory provisions related to copyright duration, see id. §§ 301–05.
19
Warhol and Lichtenstein died in 1987 and 1997 respectively. Given that copyrights
in their works last for either seventy years after death, or ninety-five years after
publication of the works (if publication occurred before 1978), then paintings by these
artists are surely under copyright protection. Id. § 302.
20
Rembrandt van Rijn, lived from 1606 to 1669. Leonardo da Vinci lived from 1452
to 1519. It would be an unusual law, indeed, that found continued copyright protection
for their paintings. However, copyright protection for works from centuries ago is not
impossible. Peter Hirtle, The Search for the Oldest Copyrighted Work in the U.S. Goes on
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Apart from this structure of economic rights are concepts of
moral rights.21 While some countries have strong moral rights, the
doctrine is sharply limited in the United States. Congress amended
the Copyright Act in 199022 to add limited moral rights largely to
seek compliance with the requirements of the Berne Convention, a
multinational copyright agreement.23 American moral rights do
apply to some works of art, making the concept relevant to many
of the works governed by the museum policies analyzed in this
article.24 Under U.S. law, moral rights give artists a legal right to
prevent or recover damages for the intentional destruction or
mutilation of some art works.25 Moral rights also give an artist the
right to have his or her name on a work, or to remove the artist‘s
name if the work has been altered in a manner that harms the
artist‘s reputation.26 The statutory provision is rich with details,
and it applies to only a narrow class of art works. In essence, it
establishes rights aimed at protecting the identity of the artist and
the integrity of the art.27
B. Copyright and Art
Except for the concepts of moral rights, the principles of
copyright law apply to works of art in generally the same manner
that they might apply to literary works, musical compositions, and

. . . , LIBRARYLAW BLOG, http://blog.librarylaw.com/librarylaw/2010/04/the-search-forthe-oldest-copyrighted-work-in-the-us-goes-on.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2012)
(exploring the possibility of current copyright protection for a diary of John Adams from
1753).
21
Principles of moral rights are examined in detail in other sources. See, e.g., Megan
M. Carpenter, Drawing a Line in the Sand: Copyright Law and New Museums, 13 VAND.
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 463, 483–91 (2011).
22
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 601–10, 104 Stat. 5089
(1990).
23
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 99-27 (1986), 1161 U.N.T.S. 3.
24
The scope of ―works of visual arts‖ is defined in detail to include only some works
created in single copies or in numbered and signed print runs up to 200 copies, but also to
exclude extensive categories for works, such as all works made for hire, and advertising
materials, among other works. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
25
Id. § 106A(a)(2).
26
Id.
27
Id. § 106A.
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even software programs.28 In a few ways, however, copyright
fundamentals do apply to art in some distinctive manner central to
this study. Some of those differences are overt examples of real
and clear differences in the law. Other differences arise from the
context and the distinctive character of artworks. When a scholar
analyzing a literary or musical work, for example, needs to
reproduce and scrutinize a particular work, many different
published versions of the work may exist, and they may exist in
multiple copies allowing often for easy availability. Works of art
are comparatively unique.29 When Vincent van Gogh makes a
painting of irises, sunflowers, or a starry night, he would usually
make only one single painting of that image. Other artists often
make multiple studies of the same subject matter, but each work
has its own distinction separating one from the other. When the
need for a particular work of art arises, a reproduction or an
alternate version may not suffice.
Art is also different from many other types of copyrighted
works because that one unique original is often in the possession of
a party that maintains tight physical control over the work and
access to it.30 Thus, one‘s ability simply to enjoy or to make a
photographic reproduction of the work may depend on consent
from the owner. The copyright owner may have legal rights with
respect to the protected expression in the artwork, but the owner of
the physical object has control over any realistic ability to access
and utilize the original work. The control asserted by the owner of
the physical object may bear no relationship to the copyright. It
may be asserted while the copyright is still in effect, and it may be
asserted indefinitely, long beyond the expiration of the copyright.
The ability to reproduce images of a Picasso hanging in the
Museum of Modern Art may depend upon cooperation from the
Picasso estate and from the museum. The ability to reproduce
28

The principles of copyright and art are examined in other publications. See, e.g.,
Phelan, supra note 3, at 180–94.
29
The concepts of ―original‖ and ―copy‖ are the subject of considerable scholarly
scrutiny. See generally Jeffrey Malkan, What is a Copy?, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
419 (2005).
30
―In tangible terms, traditional memory institutions [including museums] were
governed mostly by a paradigm of control over original authentic tangible cultural
objects.‖ Guy Pessach, [Networked] Memory Institutions: Social Remembering,
Privatization and Its Discontents, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 77 (2008).
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medieval triptychs in the Metropolitan Museum of Art may not be
constrained by copyright law, but it may well be controlled by the
policies and practices of museum officials.
Another reason for the distinctive treatment of art images as
opposed to original works of art under copyright law is the fact that
many art images comprise two or more copyrights.31 Copyright
may or may not protect the original work of art, but copyright may
subsist separately in a photographic reproduction of it.32 Almost
any photograph, from a casual snapshot to a professional work of
artistic accomplishment, is protectable by copyright in any
conventional sense.33 For a photograph of a work of art, however,
the court in Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corporation34 found
that such direct photographic reproduction of a work of art is not
eligible for copyright.35 The case was heard by the Southern
District of New York, and the court labeled such two-dimensional
copies as ―slavish‖ and determined that they lack sufficient
originality and creativity to qualify for copyright protection.36

31

Guy Pessach, Museums, Digitization and Copyright Law—Taking Stock and
Looking Ahead, 1 J. INT‘L MEDIA & ENT. L. 253, 276–77 (2007). Sometimes the interests
of the museum are in tension with the interests of the artist or other holder of the
copyright in the original work. One major association has offered a definition of fair use
intended to encourage museums to exercise fair use of artworks, while acknowledging
the right of the copyright owners. ASS‘N OF ART MUSEUM DIRS., AAMD POLICY ON THE
USE OF ―THUMBNAIL‖ DIGITAL IMAGES IN MUSEUM ONLINE INITIATIVES (2011), published
at 27 VISUAL RESOURCES 282 (2011).
32
A photographic reproduction could also, arguably at least, be a derivative of the
original artwork. See Phelan, supra note 3, at 190–92.
33
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the nineteenth century that photographs could be
protected under copyright law. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60
(1884).
34
See Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(holding that photographic painting replicas are not protected by copyright).
35
For a work to be copyrightable, it must include some minimum amount of creativity.
Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 355 (1991).
36
Bridgeman, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 197. In 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit, an appellate court with much greater legal jurisdiction, adopted the
principles of Bridgeman in Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d
1258, 1270 (10th Cir. 2008). In particular, the court held digital images of the basic
design of existing automobiles did not have copyright protection. Id.; see also Oriental
Art Printing, Inc. v. Goldstar Printing Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 542, 546–48 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (holding no copyright protection for photographs of familiar Chinese dinners on a
restaurant menu).
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One can readily see the significant reach of the Bridgeman
decision, as well as its limits. The ruling casts doubt on claims of
copyright in the millions of photographic reproductions of twodimensional works of art.37 The case also undercuts the claims of
legal protection to the livelihood of many professional
photographers. The craft of making high-quality photographs of
art, and capturing the color and lighting of an original painting is a
technique that requires extensive training and preparation as well
as expensive equipment.
To deny the photographer legal
protection for his or her labors may well erode the incentive to
produce high-quality work and to make the resulting photographs
widely accessible.
Moreover, Bridgeman is arguably of limited legal scope. A
photographer would probably not have to add much to the
photograph in order for it to be within the reach of copyright. Any
adjustment of angles or shadows, as well as inclusion of the frame
and surrounding setting into the photograph would probably be
enough to take the photograph beyond being a simple reproduction
of the painting. Further, the Bridgeman ruling was only about twodimensional works of art. Almost any photograph of a sculptural
work or other three-dimensional work will most likely include
some background elements as well as choices of angles,
shadowing, and lighting. Those choices are probably sufficient to
qualify the work for copyright protection. For purposes of this
study and its examination of the possible overreaching of copyright
claims, the greatest interest lies with photography and other
imaging of two-dimensional works of art. It is with these types of
works that the law casts the greatest doubt about claims of
copyright protection. It is also these types of works that are
probably most in demand by scholars and researchers as they seek
images to use in connection with their work.

37

See generally Karen D. Williams, Disparity in Copyright Protection: Focus on the
Finished Image Ignores the Art in the Details, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 169 (2008)
(recommending a more nuanced form of scrutiny of originality in different forms of
graphical art works).
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III. MUSEUM CLAIMS OF COPYRIGHT AND CONTROL
A. Rights of Ownership
Museums create a legal conundrum when they claim legal
rights to control images, where copyright protection is doubtful at
best.
The works in question—both the artwork and the
reproduction—may be completely in the public domain.
Nevertheless, museums often assert claims of copyright protection
to the images. If they are not in fact claiming copyright protection,
they are often asserting levels of control over those works through
contract or license terms associated with the work. Some
museums go further and assert levels of control simply through
terms of use that purport to be binding on anyone accessing the
images from a website or other source. The museum that supplies
the image is the party that is solely defining the terms of use, and it
can do so based only on its ability to control access to the work.
Yet the terms asserted are typically couched as if they were
binding provisions of law. The museum is the gatekeeper of
access to the art and to the images; in its role as a gatekeeper, the
museum is devising claims that may be overreaching.
Controlling access to the original artwork is an outgrowth of
the museum‘s possession of property, not of copyright.38 The
museum can control access to the original artwork by means as
simple and as obvious as locking the front doors. The museum can
decide who enters the premises and who can bring in the
sophisticated photographic equipment to make the quality images.
The museum then supplies those images at the request of
researchers, teachers, publishers, and anyone else seeking to use it.
A museum is certainly justified in asking for payment for services.
Producing and delivering a quality image can be expensive.
Contractual control over some uses is at least rational. A museum
may be deterred by the risks of releasing one image only to find
that it has been shared publicly with no restriction, thereby
undercutting any further incremental sales.

38

One museum director made this candid assessment: ―We control how our collection
is used not through enforcement of copyright but by limiting access to reproducible
images of it. We can deny use to a publication that we think will not use the image
appropriately.‖ Lyndel King, The Fair Use Dilemma, 75 MUSEUM NEWS 36, 37 (1997).
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B. Downstream Control of Images
The dynamic of the market transaction with the museum is
actually much more complex. The terms of the transaction and the
restrictions on the use are vastly more elaborate, as will be detailed
later in this article. The transaction is deeply affected by the
scarcity of access. That fact, combined with the apparent validity
of legalistic controls, leads to the perception of downstream control
of subsequent uses. In other words, an individual who acquires an
image directly from a museum may in fact be contractually
obligated to that museum and subject to any restrictive terms that
the user accepted. Because those restrictive terms shape the work
and therefore the way it will be seen and found by readers and
other subsequent users, the terms carry with them a perception of
the control of all uses of that image—not only by the party in
privity with its agreement with the museum. Once establishing
that perception of immediate and downstream control over the uses
of the image, the continued control becomes operationalized in the
language of museum priorities and the museum mission.
The process of downstream control may be examined in more
methodological steps. First, the museum has control over the
physical object.
By establishing and maintaining that
unquestionable control over the unique physical artwork, the
museum can clearly control the access to it. The notion that the
museum, which we assume for this purpose does not hold the
copyright in the original artwork, is able to determine this level of
control creates a perception that it has all rights. In fact, the
museum can, with few limits, demand that a photographer or other
user of the work comply with all of its conditions and restrictions
before it is permitted either to receive the image from the museum
or be allowed to enter the premises in order to make a quality
reproduction.
Second, because the museum controls the making and release
of the initial reproduction of the artwork, it exercises that authority
in turn to define restrictions in its terms of use applicable to
subsequent users. The terms in the agreement may define not only
what the immediate user can do but also sharply restrict the ability
to release the work for others. If the terms of use define how the
work may be presented in a textbook or other resource, those
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restrictions further limit the ability of downstream users to find,
acquire, and use versions of the work that they may need for their
own purposes. Because the first user needs the work and has
resolved that having the work is sufficiently important, that user
often finds himself or herself willing to accede to these restrictive
terms.
Third, the restrictive terms are then articulated and reinforced
by the museum in a manner that relates them to the mission of the
institution. The mission of a museum may be defined differently
by each organization, but in general, most museums will define
their purpose in terms of acquiring, preserving, and protecting the
integrity of original art, while also facilitating the ability of the
public to enjoy and learn from the cultural objects. The restrictions
on uses of images are arguably in furtherance of that museum by
preventing uses that may be derogatory or otherwise detract from
the preservation and promotion of the original artworks.
C. Bridgeman and the Persistence of Copyright
Although the Bridgeman ruling is more than a decade old,
some museums continue to assert outright copyright protection. It
is not unusual in almost any industry for a provider of information
resources to claim some form of protection or constraint on uses of
the materials, as museums often do. Yet bold statements of
copyright protection run directly contrary to the decision in
Bridgeman.39 The Art Institute of Chicago hosts a website that is
rich with images that anyone with an Internet connection may
access and enjoy. However, the policy statement on the website
explicitly provides, ―the text, images, data, audio, video, and other
content on the site . . . are protected by copyright . . . .‖40
This statement from the Asia Society Museum is even more
explicit and more adamant: ―All material, including text and
images, appearing on the Society‘s World Wide Web Site (the

39
See generally Mary Campbell Wojcik, The Antithesis of Originality: Bridgeman,
Image Licensors, and the Public Domain, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 257, 276
(2008) (―[I]mage licensors will persist in using the precedential ambiguity surrounding
Judge Kaplan‘s decision to intimidate image users into submission‖).
40
Terms and Conditions, THE ART INST. OF CHI., http://www.artic.edu/aic/copyright.
html (last visited Mar. 19, 2012).

2012]

MUSEUM POLICIES AND ART IMAGES

809

‗Site‘) are the property of the Society, or used by permission, and
are protected by United States and International Copyright Law
and do not constitute material in the public domain.‖41 Generic
assertions are also not uncommon, but these blanket provisions
have the effect of concealing the public domain as identified in
Bridgeman.
Claims of copyright that might be called false, erroneous, or
misleading are not unusual. Recent scholarship has stirred fresh
examination of ―copyright fraud‖ as a questionable technique used
by claimants to make unjustified claims of legal protection in order
to deter or discourage users at the least, or to collect royalties at the
worst.42 On the other hand, one could rationalize these museum
positions in a legitimate but technical manner by resolving that the
Bridgeman decision, as a ruling from only one district court,
applies only inside the jurisdiction of that district.43 The
willingness of a claimant in another district to challenge that ruling
by staking out a contrary position is a completely legitimate
approach to testing the law.
Thus, the Art Institute of Chicago may conclude that, because
it is not in the same federal district as the Bridgeman court, a court
in Chicago‘s district could resolve the issue differently and, until
then, the museum will take its own position on copyright matters.
This explanation of museum policy, however, does not hold up in
the case of the Asia Society Museum, which is located in New
York City. That museum is located inside the boundaries of the
jurisdiction of the Southern District of New York. It is therefore
inside the jurisdiction of the Bridgeman court. One has to wonder
if the Asia Society has taken its position specifically to challenge
the law.

41

Terms and Conditions, ASIA SOCIETY, http://asiasociety.org/util/terms-conditions
(last visited Mar. 19, 2012).
42
―Copyfraud by archives, museums, and other not-for-profit institutions is especially
troubling. These entities are publicly supported through tax benefits, and often
government grants, because their collections benefit the public. We should be able to
expect in return that public domain works be left in the public domain.‖ JASON MAZZONE,
COPYFRAUD AND OTHER ABUSES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 18 (2011).
43
Most notably, the Tenth Circuit adopted the reasoning of Bridgeman in a case
involving the imaging of automobile designs. See supra note 36.
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D. The Risks of Constructive Policies
What would motivate a museum to run counter to reasonably
clear principles of copyright law?
Risks associated with
noncompliance with the law have been examined in many other
general contexts. Many possible motivations could lead to this
institutional decision.
For example, the museum may be
continuing with old policy and simply has not taken the
opportunity to give it a fresh review in the years since the
Bridgeman decision. Another possibility is that the museum
believes that the Bridgeman ruling does not apply, and that its
works and the circumstances are significantly different from the
context of the Bridgeman decision.
The one statement on the Asia Society website also broadly
applies to all materials found on the site. One can easily imagine
that some materials on the site are in the public domain under the
Bridgeman doctrine, while many other photographs and images
may be legitimately protected under copyright. The museum did
not create an elaborate or detailed statement that sorts differences
among the many images available on its website. Instead the
museum chose to make a broad statement up front, leaving details
to be addressed later as needed.
An additional and likely possibility is that the museum has
been compelled to make a sweeping statement of strong copyright
protection as a result of its relationships with artists,
photographers, and other third parties. Many copyright owners
and creative individuals make their works available through
museums and other organizations, but subject to rigorous
conditions and restrictions. A museum may choose to include on
its public site strong statements of copyright protection in order to
satisfy the requirements of donors and other individuals who have
made their works available on that site. Thus, accuracy in
copyright standards becomes a bargaining chip in the decisions
related to the acquisition and availability of art images.
Consider one more example. The Peabody Essex Museum
provides images for purchase by individual users, with this general
statement:
[T]he purchase of a photograph, or scan, or a
photographic image, or the transmission of an
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electronic image, or the rental of a color
transparency does not itself carry with it the right to
publish, nor make a reproduction, scan, or transmit,
broadcast, digitize, or otherwise make available in
any form.44
The sentence may be convoluted, but the point is clear. The
museum evidently is willing to sell photographic images of works
of art and to creatively make them available through transmission,
or scan, or rental, but any acquisition by any of these means does
not include the right to publish an image or to make it more widely
available in any form.
The museum is not necessarily claiming copyright, but it is
asserting an obvious restriction on subsequent uses and sharing of
that image. Apparently, the person acquiring the image may utilize
it for personal or local uses such as teaching an art history course.
However, if the person is seeking to use it in connection with any
kind of publication or further sharing, then the user is expected to
secure an additional license. It may not be explicitly a claim of
copyright, but it is absolutely a claim of rights and control akin to
copyright and perhaps expected to trump copyright.
The difficulty of drafting more precise or open museum
policies is especially evident when considering policies that could
actually confirm that users have rights to use the materials in
question. Examined later in this article is a technique used by The
Getty to specify that it has found ―No Known Copyright
Restrictions‖ with respect to specific images. Such conclusions are
enormously beneficial to users, but could pose formidable
challenges for policymakers. On the one hand, identifying a work
as public domain is honest and helpful. Yet making such a public
statement is to offer a legal conclusion; thus museum lawyers may
at least hesitate when considering the possibility of a legal
challenge should the determination prove wrong.
The dilemma is quickly exacerbated in the online environment,
where a statement of ―public domain‖ could prove false under the

44

Melissa A. Brown & Kenneth D. Crews, Art Image Copyright and Licensing: Terms
and Conditions Governing Reproduction and Distribution, at 6 (2010), http://academic
commons.columbia.edu/item/ac:128142.

812

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 22:795

laws of a country with different rules and laws, but where many
users may be located.45 One can easily see that the temptation to
be simple and even overreaching grows as the law becomes more
complex, as the environment becomes more international, and as
beneficial statements hold the prospect of generating new
responsibilities and potential liabilities. Against these challenges,
museums must strive to find the right course.
IV. RATIONALE FOR RESTRICTIVE POLICYMAKING
A. Convergence of Causes
While this article is clearly critical of museum policies that are
overreaching, the pressures leading to such policies are not without
some rationale. The previous section of this article noted the legal
reasons why a museum might be reluctant to soften its approach
and make more definitive statements about the public domain
status of a work. Yet the terms of museum policies often embrace
more than whether or not a work is copyrighted. The same legal
reluctance about clarifying rights does not explain why a museum
would choose to actively create new restrictions related to formal
credit or alterations of the image.
Why would a museum want to make a policy that sets
restrictions regardless of what the law allows?46 This study
45
See Lara Ortega, How to Get The Mona Lisa in Your Home Without Breaking the
Law: Painting a Picture of Copyright Issues with Digitally Accessible Museum
Collections, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 567, 580–82 (2011) (examining an exception in the
Australian Copyright Act allowing cultural institutions to make some reproductions, but
only within severe constraints); Emily Hudson & Andrew T. Kenyon, Digital Access:
The Impact of Copyright on Digitisation Practices in Australian Museums, Galleries,
Libraries and Archives, 30 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 12, 13 (2007) (finding that Australian
copyright exceptions support some digital reproduction of works by museums and
galleries, but do not facilitate a general public framework for online access to copyrighted
materials); see also Keith Wotherspoon, Copyright Issues Facing Galleries and
Museums, 25 EURO. INTELL. PROP. REV. 34–39 (2003) (suggesting that the United
Kingdom would follow the reasoning in Bridgeman, in which reproductions of artistic
images that museums create and market to third parties would not garner copyright
protection).
46
In many other disciplines, copyright owners have in fact chosen to relinquish rights
that they clearly have under the law to make the work more widely available. The
movement towards open access of scientific literature and the adoption of Creative
Commons licenses are innovations in the management of intellectual property that seek to
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suggests that the motivations largely center around four concepts.
First, museums have an interest in protecting the integrity of art.47
Many museums primarily see themselves as effectively the trustee
of the aesthetic works. The museums see the need to control uses
including alterations and variations on the artworks by subsequent
users in order to protect the integrity of the image as the artist may
have conceived it.48 Second, restricted uses can drive researchers
and others back to the museum for consent to subsequent uses,
with additional fees payable to the museum.49 Licensing of images
and the sale of posters, note cards, and other products based on the
artworks within museum collections can be essential sources of
income.50
These financial prospects are not to be dismissed lightly.51
Museums are an anchor of our cultural heritage and should be
supported. Further, the museum should also be supported with our
contributions, our donations, and our purchases of worthwhile
products at the gift shop.52 Controls and restrictions over uses of
the images have the possibility of not only protecting the integrity
of the works, but also allowing uses that are monitored by the

reduce barriers to access and use of creative materials. The tendency of many museums
to assert greater control on copyrighted materials is contrary to the growing open access
perspective on intellectual property rights. Some museums have embraced open access
for images. The National Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C. announced in March 2012
a new policy of open access for images of artworks that are in the public domain. NGA
Images, a New Collection Image Resource, and Open Access Policy Launched by
National Gallery Of Art, Washington, NAT‘L GALLERY OF ART, http://www.nga.gov
/press/2012/nga_images.shtm (last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
47
See Carpenter, supra note 21, at 468–70 (describing museums as keepers of history).
48
Robin J. Allan, After Bridgeman: Copyright, Museums, and Public Domain Works
of Art, 155 U. PA. L.R. 961, 982–83 (2007).
49
Colin T. Cameron, In Defiance of Bridgeman: Claiming Copyright in Photographic
Reproductions of Public Domain Works, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 31, 59–60 (2006)
(―An assumption implied in construing the motivation to claim copyright in photographic
reproductions of public domain paintings is that the additional control creates an
opportunity to generate more revenue.‖).
50
See generally Richard Shone, Copyright, Fair or Foul?, 148 BURLINGTON MAG. 659
(Oct. 2006).
51
The leading museum association in the U.S. has done extensive surveying of
member practices and fees from licensing. See AM. ASS‘N OF MUSEUMS, AAM MEMBER
MUSEUMS RIGHTS & REPRODUCTIONS SURVEY (2004), available at http://www.panix.com
/~squigle/rarin/RCAAMSurvey2003-4.pdf.
52
See Carpenter, supra note 21, at 475.
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museum and that have the prospect of coming back to the museum,
benefiting its bottom line.53
As important as these first two reasons may be to the museum
and possibly to the artists, this article will center on a third and
fourth reasons. The third is that museums, like libraries and other
organizations, want credit for their collections and other good
work.54 A museum policy can condition use on credit to the artist
and to the institution. The fourth reason is for adherence to donor
requirements. Many collections come to museums as donations or
sales with conditions in the original transaction; a policy can
extend those agreed conditions to the user. In reality, an individual
museum policy may be shaped by a blend of different motivations
and justifications. This paper offers a closer examination of these
last two justifications.
B. Donor Restrictions and Museum Policies
Museum policy restrictions are often justified as required by
donor agreements. Museum benefactors sometimes set terms of
use for artworks and other materials that they donate or sell to the
museum. If the museum accepts the terms, the restrictions are then
contractually passed along to users. Museums should view donor
restrictions as a price paid for the materials in question, and it is a
price often borne by the public in the form of limited access or
uses. Like any price, the museum should actively seek to keep it
as low as possible.
Museum policies frequently refer explicitly to donor and third
party interests. Consider this statement from the Huntington
Library: ―permission to reproduce images . . . is granted when the
use of the materials in publications, in any format . . . complies

53

See SIMON TANNER, REPRODUCTION CHARGING MODELS AND RIGHTS POLICY FOR
DIGITAL IMAGES IN AMERICAN ART MUSEUMS: A MELLON FOUNDATION STUDY 40 (2004),
available
at
http://msc.mellon.org/research-reports/Reproduction%20charging%20
models%20and%20rights%20policy.pdf/view (questioning the prospect that museums
can or should make significant income from licensing).
54
The U.S. Supreme Court clarified that there is no right under the law of unfair
competition for the original author to be credited as the sources of materials that have
entered the public domain. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S.
23, 32, 37 (2003).
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with any donor agreements attached to the materials.‖55 If the
underlying work is in fact protected by copyright, such as many
modern artworks surely are, then museums are acting wisely to
caution users that permission from the museum is not sufficient to
address any need for permission from the artist or any other rights
holder.
Giving users a word of caution is actually good policy, yet the
role of donors is more complicated. If an artist holds copyright in
a work, that copyright can be researched and confirmed. If a
painting dates from the 1950s, and the artist died in the 1980s, we
can undertake basic research and conclude with a high level of
certainty that the work is currently protected by copyright, and the
copyright will expire typically seventy years after the death of the
artist or perhaps as of some other date depending on whether or
when the work may have been published. The research may be a
bit complicated. The legal conclusion may be a set of choices.
Nevertheless the user has at least narrowed the possibilities and
can proceed with the next steps.
By sharp contrast, the rights and claims and obligations
associated with donor agreements are strictly private matters
between the donor and the museum. An outside user of the image
has no ability to know the facts of the donor transaction, and the
museum may have reasons not to share that private business
transaction with all of its details. The user‘s only recourse when
faced with the possibility of donor restrictions on the use of images
is to ask the museum and accept the response and conditions that
the museum may provide. This is not to suggest that museums are
somehow being insidious or devious in their approach to these
matters. The reality is often quite the contrary.
In furtherance of the museum mission to preserve and make
certain artworks available, the museum may have little realistic
choice but to accept some of the conditions asserted by donors. If
the donor puts restrictions on reproductions and uses of the image,
and insists that the donor‘s name or other statement be used in
association with the images, the museum may find itself willing to
55

Permission to Publish Policy, HUNTINGTON LIBR., ART COLLECTIONS & BOTANICAL
GARDEN, available at http://www.huntington.org/huntingtonlibrary.aspx?id= 590 (last
visited Mar. 24, 2012).
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comply with the restrictions in order to obtain important
collections. One can wish that donors would not set severe
restrictions, or that museums could convincingly make the case to
the donor about the resulting problems, but unfortunately the final
transaction is often subject to conditions and restrictions which in
turn get passed along to the individual users.
C. Credit and Reputation
An additional motivation for a museum‘s conditions on the use
of images goes to the identification and reputation of the museum
or of the artist. Creative people often and understandably want
credit for their work. Without question, good practice associated
with the uses of images in teaching, scholarship, or publishing
would almost always call for properly identifying the work, the
artist, and in most instances the museum and other source of the
photographic reproduction. Due credit is often one the highest
priority concerns of a museum and artist. Little in the law,
however, addresses the issue in any direct way.56
One aspect of moral rights—the paternity right—is the right of
an author or artist to be identified in connection with uses of the
copyrighted work. That requirement exists in American copyright
law for some works of art in a tightly limited fashion. For
example, moral rights apply only to works of visual art that are
produced in 200 copies or fewer.57 The law ultimately gives the
artist the legal right to call for his or her name to be on the work,
but it places with the artist the duty to bring a legal action in order
to enforce this right.58 Few artists have the wherewithal to hire
lawyers and bring an action. One would like to expect that most

56

Concepts of credit seldom appear in copyright law. One example other than moral
rights is the prohibition against removal of ―copyright management information,‖ which
is defined in part to include the identity of the author of a work. See Copyright Act of
1976, 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c) (2006).
57
For the definition of ―works of visual art‖ that have the benefit of moral rights, see
id. § 101 (2006).
58
Few court rulings on moral rights have been handed down since the law was enacted
in 1990. One significant ruling is Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 611–12,
615 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that the intentional destruction of a public sculpture on city
property was a violation of moral rights, but did not amount to a ―willful‖ violation of
VARA).
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users would also gladly add the appropriate credit if the lack of an
artist‘s identification is brought to the user‘s attention.
Rather than relegate this issue to the nuances and the expense
of copyright law, artists and authors sometimes include a
requirement of attribution in contracts for the sale, transfer, or
other use of the work. Such attribution requirements appear in
publication agreements, and they are a staple of Creative
Commons licenses.59 Museums—as well as libraries and other
organizations—similarly condition many of their services on
receiving credit in return from the user. While moral rights are
statutorily binding on all users, contractual obligations are
generally binding only on the parties to the transaction.
Moral rights may also be asserted only by authors, but
contractual obligations can at least be pressed or negotiated by
anyone.60 Museums typically do not own the copyright in the
individual items held in the collections, and moral rights are not
transferrable in any event. Without a legal right to expect credit,
museums sometimes make statements of credit part of the
exchange for access to the collections and use of the images.
Museums clearly want the world to know that they possess
collections of research value and use those materials to support
further scholarship.
The desire to enhance one‘s reputation can easily migrate from
asking for credit to asserting control over exactly how credit is
ascribed. If a museum were to borrow concepts from the doctrine
of moral rights, the museum may ask for appropriate credit and
identification of the museum as the source of the work. The
museum may also ask for the right to remove its name from a use
to which the museum may object. Removal of one‘s name is also
consistent with a moral rights doctrine that seeks to preserve or
promote the good reputation of creative individuals.
The Georgia O‘Keeffe Museum takes what appears to be an
extra step into the hazardous arena of control and supervision of
the downstream uses of the art images. According to the
59

About, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/about (last visited Mar. 24,
2012) (providing more information regarding Creative Commons licenses).
60
Under American law, only the artist has moral rights. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17
U.S.C. § 106A(e) (2006) (providing that moral rights may not be transferred).
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museum‘s policy: ―The Georgia O‘Keeffe Museum will be
generous in granting permission to reproduce works it controls,
particularly if the request is for an article or book that will promote
Georgia O‘Keeffe‘s art and the worldwide knowledge of it.‖61 On
its face, this statement is positive in various respects. The museum
will be generous. The museum will grant permission for
potentially diverse uses. The museum will be especially generous
when the uses support knowledge and understanding of O‘Keeffe‘s
work.
On the other hand, the suggestion of a substantive standard for
the museum‘s permission opens the policy to a negative reading as
a possible interference with critical examination of O‘Keeffe. The
policy does not explicitly provide that the museum will interfere
with uses that are inconsistent with a particular perception of
O‘Keeffe‘s art. Yet the policy does suggest that the museum will
be much more willing to grant permission if the use is in
connection with a study that advances O‘Keeffe‘s art and
understanding of it—perhaps advancing that understanding in a
manner consistent with the museum‘s views. At the least, the
museum has tied its willingness to grant permission to the
substantive context of the use of the work. This step is an overt
stride by the museum to foster studies that are subject to review by
museum officials when permission is requested. At its core, this
provision exposes a museum‘s interest in using the control of
images to enhance the reputation of the museum as the source of
the work as well as the reputation of the artist as the creator of
important cultural contributions.
V. IMPLICATIONS AND VARIETIES OF OVERREACHING
A. Practical and Legal Consequences
Overreaching and assertion of rights and control through
museum policies can have multiple adverse practical and legal
consequences. From the perspective of legal policy, these
standards from museums are often an extension of copyright
61
Press/Media Guidelines, GEORGIA O‘KEEFFE MUSEUM, http://www.okeeffemuseum.
org/requests.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2012).
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protection beyond the limits of the law. Copyright law is a form of
legal rights, subject to limitations, that is developed slowly and
meticulously by Congress and the courts, exploring the competing
interests of rights holders and users. The result may be a
complicated and nuanced law, but it is also a law that reflects
decisions made by lawmakers as they struggle with individual
cases and are held accountable to the public in general for the
implications of their decisions in the next situation. Probably no
one would declare the body of copyright law perfect, but by having
been cultivated through legislation and litigation, copyright at least
has the promise of reflecting diverse interests and pressures.
When individuals or organizations unilaterally set policy terms
regarding the use of materials, they are in effect crafting rules and
restrictions that are not necessarily accountable to anyone other
than themselves. If the realistic ability to obtain images of unique
works of art is within the museum‘s control, then the museum‘s
unilateral restrictions become quasi-copyright standards for the
public‘s ability to use a specific image. If a large number of
museums set widely divergent rules and standards, as is in fact the
case, the result is not merely the diminished usability of an
individual work, but instead an array of diverse and befuddling
barriers that conspire to confuse researchers and further complicate
the pressures on researchers who are drawing upon images from
several museums for a single project.
A further critical consequence of restrictive policies is the
threat to the public domain. Museum images may be in the public
domain because, among other reasons, the copyrights eventually
expire or the photographic reproductions are not copyrightable at
all under Bridgeman. Any assertion of control by the museum is a
threat to core principles of the law: copyright protection is limited,
and the public domain also supports creativity. Copyright law
exists to encourage the promotion of creating and sharing new
works. The law operates on the theory that granting legal rights to
authors encourages authors to create new works and to make those
works publicly available. Similarly, the public domain enables
other members of the public to benefit from and use those works in
ways the author may not have anticipated and may not have
wanted. The public domain fosters innovation by allowing the
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public at large to use the works and to create the next generation of
knowledge and aesthetics.
Sometimes the use of a public domain work is straight
reproduction, which can serve the purpose of educating and
informing readers about the materials. In other situations,
especially involving art, the works may be altered or modified in
their next incarnation. New art rarely exists in isolation. Instead,
new art is routinely built upon the creative work of artists who
came before. When a museum constrains the public domain, it is
inhibiting new creativity and scholarly exploration. Any burden on
the public domain is also in direct defiance of a central premise of
copyright law. The museum may very well be fulfilling a mission
of preserving the integrity of existing art, but it is not serving the
public interest in the advancement of either art or the law.
While the conditions on single images may be manageable in
isolation, the reality is that scholarly pursuits often require multiple
images from multiple sources. Each restrictive museum policy
thus adds to the immediate burden on scholarship, publishing, and
other means for the public to find and appreciate works of art that
are vital for understanding culture and aesthetic development. The
fees alone that many museums charge for the use of works can be
modest on an individual basis, but collectively they can impose an
extraordinarily high cost for a publication that includes multiple
images.
If images are removed from the publication because of costs,
the loss to readers and scholars is obvious. If the restrictions and
conditions from museums prevent scholarly inquiry, then the study
of art history and technique are inhibited. For example, art
scholarship often calls for the use of detailed excerpts from the
larger work, or the experimentation with color and lighting to
achieve new understandings of the elements of a painting or a
sculptural work. Many museum licenses would bar exactly these
activities.
B. Varieties of Overreaching
From the museum‘s perspective, the license and policy terms
may be simply an effort to prevent undesirable uses and perhaps to
collect revenues in exchange for permissions.
From the
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perspective of copyright standards, by sharp contrast, the policies
often represent multiple forms of overreaching. Of course, not
every museum is susceptible to charges of overreaching, and some
restrictions on use might be justified in different ways.
Nevertheless, any restrictions beyond the reach of copyright
are in defiance of the law and the social and intellectual objectives
that copyright aims to serve. An examination of selected standards
in effect at major museums suggests patterns among documents,
but also distinct forms of copyright overreaching. Four types are
especially prevalent and have critical implications for users. They
are identified here, with examples. While such an examination of
museum policies is inevitably a challenge to and critique of them,
this article also strives to give examples of museum standards that
address issues in a constructive manner and that avoid negative
consequences.
1. Asserting Rights to the Public Domain
Copyright claims to works that are or may likely be in the
public domain occur in at least two common situations. A museum
may assert claims that are beyond the scope of copyright.
Examples arise when a museum claims copyrights that are cast in
doubt by the ruling in the Bridgeman case. A second situation
would arise when a museum places a generic statement of
copyright on a website or image collection, taking the efficient
route to claim the copyright, but in the process sweeping with it
elements and pieces that even the museum would agree are outside
the bounds of copyright law. The clearest form of this assertion
would be an all-encompassing policy statement that disregards the
basic fact that copyrights expire. A general claim that embraces
ancient works obviously ignores copyright fundamentals. Such
assertions are unfortunately common practice.
Consider a few examples of broad assertions of copyright. The
Harvard Art Museums website includes a statement that is a staple
among many museums policies:
The Site and much of the text, images, graphics,
audio and video clips, information and other content
of the Site (collectively, the ―Content‖) are
protected by copyright, trademark and other laws.
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We and applicable third parties own the copyright
and other rights in the Site and the Content. You
may use the Site and the Content only in the manner
and for the purposes specified in these Terms of
Use.62
The Museum of Fine Art Boston offers a more succinct and
explanatory version: ―Text and images on the MFA‘s Web site,
mfa.org—created as a public educational resource—are the
property of the MFA and are protected by copyright.‖63 Chances
are good that some image in an extensive and dynamic collection
is in the public domain, which would technically disprove the
museum‘s statement and convert it into a form of overreaching.
Even without a quest for some elusive example, such statements
are overreaching if in fact the Bridgeman doctrine applies. The
MFA confronts that possibility directly: ―The Images depict
objects from the MFA‘s collection in a manner expressing the
scholarly and aesthetic views of the MFA. The Images are not
simple reproductions of the works depicted and are protected by
copyright.‖64
This statement from MFA makes clear that the museum sees its
images as much more than the ―slavish‖ reproductions envisioned
by the Bridgeman court. The MFA has gone even further than the
Asia Society; where the Asia Society claims only a copyright, the
MFA uses its terms in an apparent attempt to rationalize the claim
by evidently distinguishing the Bridgeman case. A museum is not
likely to concede that its policy is overreaching, and the MFA
could, from its perspective, view its policy as merely reiterating the
law: if the images are not mere reproductions, and include some
creative expression, they are distinguishable from the images in
Bridgeman and ultimately protectable.

62

Terms of Use, HARVARD ART MUSEUMS, http://www.harvardartmuseums.org
/home/terms_of_use.dot (last updated Apr. 12, 2011).
63
Web Use and Gallery Photography, MUSEUM OF FINE ARTS BOSTON, http://stage.
mfa.org/collections/mfa-images/web-use-and-gallery-photography (last visited Mar. 24,
2012).
64
Terms and Conditions, MUSEUM OF FINE ARTS BOSTON, http://www.mfa.org
/collections/mfa-images/terms-and-conditions (last visited Mar. 24, 2012).
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A more helpful policy would not necessarily assert rights, but
would instead identify when works enter the public domain.65
Guidance about the duration of copyright protection can give users
a clear signal that the public domain exists and may apply to the
particular work in question. The Getty takes this path and offers
users a detailed set of terms related to the rights of third parties. In
particular, The Getty expressly adopts the ―No Known Copyright
Restrictions‖ statement for some of the works that it has identified
as likely to exist in the public domain.66
At the very least, the statement suggests that The Getty has
investigated the work—implicitly under U.S. law—and that the
museum itself is not asserting any claims. Users are not directly
told that the work is in the public domain. However, the museum
removed a few practical barriers to public uses of the works and
likely alleviated a variety of risks and concerns. Although this
statement is not quite a declaration that the work is in the public
domain, some museum policymakers may be reticent to make even
this suggestion about the legal status of the work, as explored
earlier in this article.
2. Asserting Legal Rights that the Museum Does Not Hold
In some respects, this form of overreaching may be the most
difficult to identify among the policy provisions, but it may be the
most justifiable.67 The previous category of overreaching involves
assertions of rights where no rights exist. This category entails
assertions by the museum to rights that may be legitimate, but are
held by others. On the surface, if any party holds a legitimate
copyright, and the museum standard calls for adherence to the
65

According to an official at The Getty, ―For reasons that seem too frequently
unexamined, many museums erect barriers that contribute to keeping quality images of
public domain works out of the hands of the general public, of educators, and of the
general milieu of creativity.‖ Kenneth Hamma, Public Domain Art in an Age of Easier
Mechanical Reproducibility, D-LIB MAG. (Nov. 2005), http://www.dlib.org/dlib/
november05/hamma/11hamma.html.
66
Terms of Use/Copyright, THE GETTY, http://www.getty.edu/legal/copyright.html
(last visited Mar. 29, 2012).
67
Museums typically do not hold the copyrights in the works of art, and occasionally a
dispute arises between the museum and the rights holder. See Mary Campbell Wojcik,
The Antithesis of Originality: Bridgeman, Image Licensors, and the Public Domain, 30
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 257, 271–75 (2008).
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legal rights, then the terms of use are little more than a reiteration
of the status quo. If the museum‘s terms include broad statements
of copyright protection, then assertions on behalf of third parties
within may be merely an expedient way to articulate possible
diverse claims of rights.
The assertion may arise indirectly whenever a museum
stipulates that users need permission from the museum solely
because the museum possesses the artwork or other object. The
Guggenheim Museum explicitly requires permission from the
museum in addition to any legal permission that may be necessary
from the copyright owner:
The Guggenheim Museum is a contemporary art
museum and therefore most of our works are still in
copyright as an artwork remains the intellectual
property of the artist and/or artist‘s estate for 70
years after the artist‘s death. This means that
permission to use the artwork must be obtained
from the copyright owner as well as from the
Guggenheim and that additional fees may apply.68
If the goal is to assure recognition or credit to the museum,
more direct and efficient alternatives are available. If the goal is to
assure that all necessary permissions are sought—and occasionally
the museum does hold the copyright—a less sweeping approach is
possible. Some museums do employ more flexible provisions that
call users‘ attention to the copyright issues without risks of
overreaching. A statement that materials may have copyright, and
that clearance from the rights holder may be in order, is not
overreaching. It is a simple and helpful statement of fact. The
Carnegie Museum of Art takes this approach: ―Carnegie Museum
of Art does not hold copyright for most images in the collection;
copyright clearance must be obtained by the applicant.‖69 The
implied message is that copyright permission must be obtained—if
legally warranted.

68

To Use Guggenheim Images, GUGGENHEIM, http://www.guggenheim.org/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=49&Itemid=99 (last visited Mar. 29, 2012).
69
Rights and Reproductions, CARNEGIE MUSEUM OF ART, http://web.cmoa.org
/?page_id=69 (last visited Mar. 29, 2012).
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The Carnegie statement is easily defensible as a matter of fact.
If copyright clearance is needed, the user has to obtain it. The
Georgia Museum of Art (―GMOA‖) seems intent on taking a
similar stance, with a bit more explanation:
[GMOA] can grant permissions only to the extent of
its ownership of the rights relating to the request.
Certain works of art, as well as the photographs of
those works of art, may be protected by copyright,
trademark, or related interests not owned by
[GMOA].
The responsibility of ascertaining
whether any such rights exist and for obtaining all
other necessary permissions remains with the
applicant.
Written notification of permissions
granted by other copyright holders must be
submitted in advance to GMOA.70
GMOA goes to some detail to clarify that it may not hold all
legal rights associated with works and images from the collections.
That explicit clarification is an important step toward explaining
the application of the law. However, GMOA equivocates by
including the final sentence which does not state that permissions
are necessary; it requires any written permissions to be submitted
to the museum, presumably for some form of review, critique, or
approval. Whatever the purpose, the last sentence quoted above
interjects the museum into the permissions process, even after
acknowledging that the museum may not hold rights.
In some respects, a policy calling for permissions is the mirror
image of the ―No Known Copyright Restrictions‖ statement
described in the previous section. It is a way of suggesting that
some copyright restrictions do apply. Even without details, simply
making that declaration—presumably accurately—is a constructive
heads up to users that copyright investigation and clearance may be
warranted. The policy becomes overreaching when it requires
permission in all cases, and when that permission must be from the
museum that does not necessarily hold the legal rights.

70
Rights and Reproductions, GA. MUSEUM OF ART, http://www.georgia
museum.org/art/rights-and-reproductions (last visited Mar. 29, 2012).
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3. Asserting Rights Beyond Copyright
Copyright law grants broad rights of control, but it does not
grant all rights. It is not unusual in any industry to leverage finite
intellectual property rights for additional gain. For example,
copyright generally does not provide a right to payment, but
copyright owners routinely license or transfer their legal rights in
exchange for money. Similarly, authors and other rights holders
frequently grant copyright licenses in exchange for meeting a
range of conditions—from precise statements of credit to
restrictions on territory, duration, quantity, or other circumstances
of use. These limits become problematic when they unduly burden
customary and beneficial uses of art images, or when the
conditions are so complex or wide reaching that they distort a
conventional sense of the copyright trade off. Difficulties are
further compounded when the terms cannot be negotiated and
purport to rigidly burden researchers and other users.
Museum policies often set forth ostensibly non-negotiable
terms that attempt to limit uses in ways far beyond what copyright
law specifically allows. Even some of the most conventional
terms, borrowed from years of experience with licensing and
publishing, are in this category. The Brooklyn Museum of Art
stipulates: ―Permission fees are applicable for one-time
reproduction rights in one language, one edition only unless
otherwise negotiated.‖71 Similar clauses are standard in licensing
practice. Viewed another way, these clauses are an inherent barrier
on the advancement of scholarship.72 If an author or publisher
needs to return to the source for renewed permission with each
edition or translation, the ability to move ahead with updated and
revised versions of a publication is obviously circumscribed.73
71

Image Services Fee Schedule, BROOKLYN MUSEUM, http://www.brooklynmuseum.
org/uploads/Image_Services_Fee_Schedule.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2012).
72
An early study of museum licenses stated, ―The one-time license method of
acquiring rights to reproduce images is outmoded in an age of rapidly advancing
technology.‖ Kim L. Milone, Dithering Over Digitization: International Copyright and
Licensing Agreements Between Museums, Artists, and New Media Publishers, 5 IND.
INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 393, 396 (1995).
73
A lawsuit was filed against the Berkeley Historical Society testing the enforceability
of a restriction of one-time use with respect to public domain images supplied by the
society. The case was reportedly settled. Some reflections from individuals close to the
case are included in comments at Mary Minow, Berkeley Historical Society Lawsuit,
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Restrictions are also commonly drafted around technological
specifications. The Carnegie Museum of Art provides: ―Digital
reproductions must be low-resolution . . . and/or password
protected . . . ; CD-DVDs must employ encryption protections.‖74
Several museums state exact limits on the resolution or size of
images used in printed works and on websites. The Brooklyn
Museum of Art stipulates: ―Digital reproductions must be low
resolution. When permission is granted for web sites, the image
can be no larger than 800 pixels on the longest side.‖75
The Ringling Museum of Art requires approval of any color
reproductions of image proofs from the museum.76 It is hardly
alone in requiring oversight of coloring. The Frick Collection sets
standards for color and even paper: ―No reproduction may be
printed on colored stock, and black-and-white photographs may
not be printed with colored ink.‖77 The Portland Art Museum adds
further conditions: ―The reproduction must not be cropped, bled
off the page, printed on color stock, or with colored ink, nor have
anything superimposed on the image.‖78
These examples are hardly uncommon. They are indicative of
the ability of museums to use one element of control to bargain for
more. They also reveal that copyright law itself is far from
addressing many of the issues that concern museums. This article
has argued that some art images are correctly in the public domain.
Even assuming that the images are not in the public domain and
that the museum holds the copyright, the policy statements affirm
LIBRARYLAW BLOG (Aug. 25, 2005), http://blog.librarylaw.com/librarylaw/2005/
08/can_a_library_m.html.
74
Fee Schedule, CARNEGIE MUSEUM OF ART, http://web.cmoa.org/?page_id=253 (last
visited Apr. 2, 2012).
75
Melissa A. Brown & Kenneth D. Crews, Art Image Copyright and Licensing: Terms
and Conditions Governing Appearance & Composition of Images, at 15,
http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/item/ac:128142 (includes summary of policy
obtained from the Brooklyn Museum).
76
Application for Reproduction Rights and Request for Photographic Materials, THE
JOHN & MABLE RINGLING MUSEUM OF ART, http://www.ringling.org/uploadedFiles/
Resources/Collections/Rights_Reproduction.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2012).
77
Application for Reproduction of Archival Materials for Publication, THE FRICK
COLLECTION, http://www.frick.org/assets/PDFs/library/archives_pub_app _2004.pdf (last
visited Apr. 2, 2012).
78
Copyright, PORTLAND ART MUSEUM, http://portlandartmuseum.org/about/copyright/
(last visited Apr. 2, 2012).
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that many museums are looking for a specific set of standards that
the law does not provide. Hence the motivation to reach beyond
the law and craft innovative rules of practice—but rules that in turn
can hinder the use and enjoyment of art.
4. Asserting Simulated Claims of Moral Rights
Although the scope of moral rights in the U.S. is exceptionally
narrow, it does apply to some works of visual art.79 Moral rights
allow artists a legal right of paternity—the right to have the artist‘s
name on the work. Moral rights also give authors a right to
prevent the intentional destruction or alteration of many works.
These rights have given artists an occasional legal victory as they
seek to protect the integrity of their works.80 Nevertheless, the
American doctrine of moral rights applies narrowly to relatively
few works and does not prevent many uses of art images that a
rights holder might find objectionable. As with so many aspects of
copyright, if the law does not provide what you want, look instead
to contractual obligations. Hence, museum policies and practices
often establish terms and conditions that are akin to moral rights.
As with many terms, requirements in museum policies to credit
the source are based on facially understandable desires. Including
the name of the artist in connection with the use of the image is
consistent with well-established principles of moral rights. By
contrast, museums as the owner of the original work of art or the
supplier of a photographic image generally do not have claims of
moral rights in the United States or in other countries.
Nevertheless, a policy request from a museum to include credit to
the institution is not unusual and is often not unduly burdensome.
79

Some scholars have argued strongly for greater moral rights, applicable to a wider
range of works. See generally, e.g., ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF
CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES (Stanford Law
Books 2010).
80
Prior to the passage of the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), various U.S. states
provided for the protection of moral rights under ―theories of copyright, unfair
competition, defamation, invasion of privacy, and breach of contract.‖ Waiver of Moral
Rights in Visual Artworks, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.
gov/reports/exsum.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2012). In Gilliam v. American Broadcasting
Companies, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 23–24 (2d Cir. 1976), the court found that ABC‘s
unauthorized edits of a Monty Python television program created an actionable mutilation
of the work derived from the concept of droit moral and protected under the Lanham Act.
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Indeed, generously citing sources is ordinarily welcomed as good
practice in any scholarly study.
Some museums go far beyond simple requests for credit and
call for various statements of identity and control. The Fine Arts
Museum of San Francisco allows uses of images with this caveat:
―Your product must be copyrighted and contain general notice of
copyright which includes the following language . . . .‖81 First, this
policy statement is a direct, yet odd, interference with the
independent decision of the user to claim or not claim copyright
protection for an article or other project that might include the art
image. The museum‘s policy seems to be directly undercutting
any notion that the author of the study may have about either
making the work available in the public domain or possibly even
interfering with the selection of a Creative Commons license.82
This claim of credit and assertion of downstream rights is brazen at
best.83
Moral rights can protect against destruction or alteration of
artworks, and policy statements from museums often incorporate
this concept in extraordinary detail. Policies often prohibit the use
of images to create derivative works. Also barred under the
standards of many museums is any alteration of the work or
bleeding of the image off the printed page. Policies sometimes
prohibit cropping or masking of the image, or superimposition of
any text on top of the image. Perhaps most pernicious for
scholarly study are policies which constrain the use of detailed
excerpts from art images.84
81

Conditions for Print and Electronic Publication, FINE ARTS MUSEUMS OF SAN
FRANCISCO, http://deyoung.famsf.org/conditions-print-and-electronic-publication (last
visited Mar. 30, 2012).
82
CREATIVE COMMONS, supra note 59.
83
The same policy also requires that the use of the image be accompanied by the
following language: ―Warning: All rights reserved. Unauthorized public performance,
broadcasting, transmission, or copying, mechanical or electronic, is a violation of
applicable laws. This product and individual images contained within are protected
under the Laws of the U.S. and other countries. Unauthorized duplication, distribution,
transmission, or exhibition of the whole or of any part therein may result in civil liability
and criminal prosecution. The downloading of images is not permitted.‖ Conditions for
Print and Electronic Publication, supra note 81.
84
Museums do not often outright bar the use of detail, but they do subject them to
review and consent. This statement is from the North Carolina Museum of Art: ―Each
object must be reproduced in its entirety on all or part of a single page unless otherwise
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Examples of confining and deleterious policy language are
legion. The Frick Collection policy stipulates: ―Permission to
reproduce is granted so long as the image is reproduced in full.
Requests to copy, bleed, tone, silhouette, superimpose type matter,
or alter an image in any way must be included in the application
with the exact layout of proposed alteration.‖85 Details are a
mainstay of scholarly inquiry, and they allow experts to examine
specific aspects of the artwork more closely in order to better
understand the technique and the message of the painting.
Similarly, the Detroit Institute of Arts makes this provision:
―Any color manipulation, alteration, cropping or addition to the
image is prohibited and will automatically render the license void.
Overprinting of text on an image requires specific permission.‖86
An artist may reasonably have concerns about any such uses of his
or her creative work. The dilemma in the context of museums,
however, is that very often the artist is no longer alive to express
concerns or assert any rights. Under U.S. law, the right of the
artist to assert any such moral rights is in most instances limited to
the lifetime of the artist.87 The copyright may survive seventy
years after the death of the artist, but the moral rights generally do
not.
Thus this assertion of quasi-moral rights runs counter to two
general principles of concern to this study. First, the policies are
used to assert a roster of rights that exceed the equation of
copyright law as developed by Congress. Second, to the extent
that the museum is asserting these rights with respect to works of
deceased artists and works in the public domain that no longer
have copyright protection, the museum policies are functioning as
an extension of copyright-like claims far beyond the reach of
approved by the Museum in advance. An approved detail must be identified in the
caption.‖ Melissa A. Brown, Art Image Copyright and Licensing: Terms and Conditions
Governing Appearance & Composition of Images, at 10 (2010), http://academic
commons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:128152 (includes summary of policy obtained from
the North Carolina Museum of Art).
85
Id. at 33.
86
Id. at 25.
87
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(1) (2006). In an odd variation on the
rule, if the work of art is in existence at the time of passage of the act in 1990, but title to
the physical work was as of that date still with the artist, then the moral rights last for the
full term of copyright protection. See id. § 106A(d)(2).
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protection that was carefully crafted in the shaping of actual
copyright law.88
CONCLUSION
Copyright overreaching comes in many forms, and museum
policies and licenses are but one version. An examination of
policies from U.S. museums suggests four varieties of copyright
overreaching by museum standards: assertions of false copyrights;
claims to copyrights not held by the museum; assertion of control
beyond rights of copyright; and claims of quasi-moral rights.
Isolating discrete forms of overreaching can help clarify the
relationship between museum standards and the norms of
copyright law. Recognizing that nexus can help one understand
how far some policies have moved from the principles of copyright
law.
Analysis of museum policies can also aid in a comparative
understanding of terms and practices, opening exploration of
alternative approaches for policymaking on similar issues. While
this article is critical of overreaching policies, the examination of
museum practices also highlights proactive alternatives that some
museums have employed to prevent or at least reduce risks of
overreaching. Consider this statement from the Guggenheim:
In order to further support the work of teachers and
educators, in accordance with our own charitable
and educational mission, we therefore consent to the
following additional uses of our Site: . . .
reproduction, distribution, display, transmission,
performance, and use of the Content . . . by
individual teachers and other educators if done for
the limited purpose of classroom or workshop
instruction (including online instruction) in a

88

Leveraging legal rights to gain contractual obligations beyond the term of copyright
protection has been grounds for claims of ―copyright misuse,‖ a doctrine that can result in
a loss of the copyright. See, e.g., Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979
(4th Cir. 1990).
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school,
museum,
or
other
educational
organization . . . .89
The Guggenheim‘s policy statement is a proactive step to assure
public rights of use and to facilitate beneficial activities whether or
not they are established in copyright law.90
Despite the availability of options, many museums continue to
assert claims that do no comport with the law and that impose
burdensome restrictions on users of art images. This article
identifies some of the root causes of these conventional practices.
Some of the causes may be described as legal inertia. For a
museum to take a position that works are actually in the public
domain or otherwise available for use is to take a public legal
position, and with it go responsibilities for errors and
misconstructions. Museums are also themselves burdened by
restrictions that they sometimes are obliged to pass along. A
collection may come to the institutions with conditions and limits
imposed by the donor or artist. If the museum accepts those terms,

89

Terms and Conditions of Use, SOLOMON R. GUGGENHEIM FOUND.,
http://www.guggenheim.org/terms-conditions/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2012). Many
education and research uses of images could be within fair use. See Phelan, supra note 3,
at 197–202. Fair use in American law is codified at Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §
107 (2006). The question of whether particular uses are fair is outside the scope of this
article. The key point of this study is the extent to which museum practices support or
hinder public uses of art images. For an insightful and recent statement about fair use of
art images, see VISUAL RESOURCES ASS‘N, STATEMENT ON THE FAIR USE OF IMAGES FOR
TEACHING, RESEARCH, AND STUDY (2011), published at 27 VISUAL RESOURCES 286
(2011).
90
Some other museums have similarly helpful language in their policies. From the
Milwaukee Art Museum:
Fair use of copyrighted material includes the use of protected
materials for noncommercial educational purposes, such as teaching,
scholarship, research, criticism, commentary, and news reporting.
Unless otherwise noted, users who wish to download or print text,
audio, video, image and other files from the Milwaukee Art
Museum‘s Web site for such uses are welcome to do so without the
Milwaukee Art Museum‘s express permission. Users must cite the
author and source of this material as they would material from any
printed work; the citation should include the [museum‘s] URL. . . .
Rights & Reproduction, MILWAUKEE ART MUSEUM, http://www.mam.org/
info/policies/rights-reproduction.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
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it may have no choice but to further impose them on subsequent
users.91
More philosophically, many museums see themselves as
responsible for the integrity and reputation of the art and the artist.
That is an admirable vision, and it is consistent in some respects
with the aims of moral rights. However, museum policies often
become a detailed litany of specific credit lines, permission
requirements, and specifics about cropping, coloration, alterations,
and even whether the image may run over the edge of printed
pages in a book or other study. Art is a noble venture, and
museums are crucial for advancing the public‘s understanding and
appreciation of it.
Yet sometimes creative exploration,
comprehension, and advancement of art comes from alteration,
manipulation, and mashup. Museums that set limits on innovative
pursuits risk setting limits on experimentation and promotion of art
itself.
This article offers a new analytical means for better
understanding how museums overreach their copyrights. One
practical outcome of such an examination of museum policies
could be to encourage museum officials and others to focus more
clearly on individual policy terms, their consequences, and the
possible alternative standards. The most important practical
objective, however, would be to encourage a reconsideration of
policy terms at individual museums. Much of this article is shaped
by a copyright perspective; the more important perspective is the
encouragement of public knowledge and appreciation of art. To
that end, the time has come for a rethinking of museum policies.92
91

These pressures and others are part of the fundamental transformation that museums
are experiencing. See Carpenter, supra note 21, at 466–67 (―The very identity of the
museum has come into question over the last couple of decades. Not only have museum
professionals increasingly questioned the function and purpose of museums, but donors,
artists, politicians, businesspeople, and the public have done so, as they are asked with
greater frequency to support museums through donations, financial sponsorships,
legislation, policy decisions, and attendance.‖).
92
Some backlash has begun. A statement from the Max Planck Institute challenges
the constraints and claims from museums and urges, ―[r]epositories should define access
to cultural heritage objects solely as owners, not as copyright holders.‖ See Best Practices
for Access to Images: Recommendations for Scholarly Use and Publishing, MAX PLANCK
INST. FOR THE HISTORY OF SCI. (Jan. 5, 2009), http://www.mpiwgberlin.mpg.
de/PDF/MPIWGBestPracticesRecommendations.pdf.
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At a time when visual images are becoming a more important
means of communication, and museums are making vast and
diverse collections available online for access worldwide, the need
for reevaluation is imperative.93 The opportunity for improved
policymaking never has been as possible or as important.

93

See Ortega, supra note 45, at 582–84.

